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Abstract
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational e¤ects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we
show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations
about promisees’expectations) leads to a signi…cant change in promisor behavior. We
provide evidence that a promisor’s aversion to disappointing a promisee’s expectation
leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of
conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the …ndings of
previous contributions as special cases.
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Introduction

To facilitate production and exchange over time, parties often make promises in order to
commit to a particular course of action. There are three main reasons why a party would
honor such an obligation (Dixit 2009). The …rst is the existence of a third party enforcement
mechanism, as studied in the formal contracting literature beginning with Mirrlees (1976)
and Holmström (1979). A second reason for honoring an obligation is the reputational incentive that arises when a party is concerned that reneging on a promise might hurt future
payo¤s, as studied extensively in the literature on relational contracting (Macaulay 1963,
Klein and Le- er 1981, Bull 1987, Kreps 1990, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Levin 2003).
A third reason, and the focus of the present paper, is the moral force of promise-keeping. A
string of recent studies o¤ers experimental evidence that promises, even if they come in the
form of mere cheap talk, considerably enhance subsequent levels of cooperation in experimental trust and dictator games (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg
2006, Vanberg 2008, Charness and Dufwenberg 2011). In this paper, we investigate the
third channel, speci…cally how expectations about future payo¤s in‡uence promise-keeping.
By exogenously varying expectations, we provide evidence that a promisor’s aversion to
disappointing a promisee’s expectations leads her to behave more generously.
While the practical relevance of the moral force of promise-keeping is undisputed, there
is a vigorous debate in economics, social psychology, philosophy, and law about why people
keep (or should keep) their promises in the absence of explicit contractual and reputational
concerns.1 A clear understanding of what drives a person to keep her promise is essential
to harnessing the bene…cial e¤ects of promises in institutional design, whether it be in the
design of legal policy, regulatory regimes, contracts, or organizations.
Two leading explanations for the moral force of promise-keeping have been proposed.
Proponents of the expectation-based theory argue that promisors (senders of promises) keep
their word in order to avoid guilt incurred by failing to meet the expectations created in
promisees (receivers of promises). A promisor would therefore be more likely to keep her
promise if she believed that the promisee expected her to keep her promise.2 In contrast,
1

Notable contributions to the broader literature on promise-keeping in political sciences and social psychology include Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), Sally (1995), and
Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007). In legal philosophy, classic references include Fried (1981), Atiyah (1983), and
Scanlon (1998). For a recent contribution containing a survey of the previous literature, see Shi¤rin (2008).
2
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) provide experimental evidence consistent with expectation-based the-
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the commitment-based theory claims that promisors have a preference for keeping their word
independent of the expectations of promisees. A promisor would therefore su¤er a cost from
behaving in a way inconsistent with what she has promised.3 The factors emphasized by
these explanations are not mutually exclusive: a promisor may both keep her promise in order to avoid feeling guilt and to avoid su¤ering an additional cost independent from feeling
that guilt. However, previous experimental research has either failed to disentangle these
two theories or has only documented unambiguous support for the commitment-based explanation. The evidence on the role of expectations has been inconclusive. On the one hand,
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Guerra and Zizzo (2004), Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2009), Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel (2011), Regner and Harth (2014), and Khalmetski,
Ockenfels, and Werner (2015) present evidence that the recipient’s expectations in‡uence
the other player’s behavior in a variety of dictator, trust, and lost wallet games. On the
other hand, Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, and Torsvik (2010) document that the recipient’s expectations do not matter. However, all of these studies derived
their …ndings in settings where there was no direct promissory link between the two parties.4
Instead, they tested whether a decision maker (the “dictator”) is in‡uenced in her decision
by the recipient’s expectations. They therefore did not directly test whether promisees’
expectations in‡uenced promise-keeping.5
Using a novel design which exogenously varies expectations while preserving promissory
links, this paper is the …rst to test the expectation-based theory of promise-keeping. We
…nd that expectations matter and that this result is primarily driven by dictators’decisions
when they had previously made a promise. Consistent with these results, we argue that
the inconclusive evidence for the expectation-based account in the prior literature might
be due to the fact that a recipient’s expectations do not matter, or at least matter much
less to a dictator if she has not given a promise. One reason for this might be that a
ories, but do not exogenously vary second-order expectations.
3
Experimental evidence for the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping can be found in the
contributions of Braver (1995), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004),
Vanberg (2008), and Ismayilov and Potters (2012).
4
For example, in Vanberg (2008), recipient expectations are exogenously varied through third-party
promises, but this variation comes at the expense of a broken promissory link between the two parties.
In Ellingsen et al (2010), no promises are ever made to begin with.
5
These papers still contribute to our understanding of promises because promises are one of many ways
to create expectations in recipients. However, they do not study whether there is something special about
expectations created and supported by a direct promise.
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promise creates a sense of responsibility in the promisor, perhaps because the promisor thinks
that her act of promising caused the promisee’s expectations, or perhaps because a promise
establishes a personal connection that increases the salience of the promisee’s expectations.
We propose a theory of conditional guilt aversion in which a promisor is in‡uenced by her
promisee’s expectations but only if those expectations are supported by the promise made by
the promisor. This theory is consistent with our experimental results and nests the …ndings
of previous contributions as special cases.
One implication of our results is that promisors can create commitment by explicitly encouraging and inviting the creation of expectations (e.g., through advertisement, or through
explicit contractual terms displacing background legal defaults) and that, ex post, promisees
should make their expectations salient in order to encourage promisors to keep their promises,
especially in situations where other incentives to perform a contract are muted. For example,
Eigen (2012) argues that an e¤ective way to assure compliance is to remind a contracting
party that he has made a promise when entering into a contract. Common law also tracks
our account of conditional guilt aversion. First, it recognizes the centrality of promises: every
legally enforceable contract requires the existence of a promise as one of its elements (Restatement 2d of Contracts §1). Second, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, common
law does not recognize detrimental reliance by a disappointed party as a basis for a claim
unless this reliance was induced by the other party’s promise (Restatement 2d of Contracts
§90).6
In particular, we use a trust game where a dictator (trustor, she) can make a free-form
promise to a recipient (trustee, he) and the recipient can decide whether to trust the dictator
and to remain in the game. Our main innovation is to introduce a move of nature after this
opt-in decision which determines the probability that it will be technically possible for the
dictator to keep her promise. Both parties learn at this point whether the game is played
with a “reliable random device” under which there is a high probability that the dictator
will be able to keep her promise or whether the game is played with an “unreliable random
device,” under which there is a low probability that the dictator will be able to keep her
promise. In the next step, another move of nature determines whether the dictator is able
to perform or not. While both parties know with which random device the game is played,
6

See Stone and Stremitzer (2016) for a follow-up experiment testing the e¤ect of detrimental reliance by
the promisee on promise-keeping and for further discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

4

only the dictator but not the recipient learns whether or not the dictator is able to perform.
Therefore, a dictator who knows she is able to perform may face two kinds of recipients:
either the recipient has high expectations, as he has learned that the game is played with the
reliable random device, or he has low expectations, as he has learned that the game is played
with the unreliable random device. This design allows us to compare promise-keeping rates
among dictators who are both able to keep their promises but hold di¤erent second-order
beliefs (beliefs about how much the receiver expects to receive), depending on whether the
history of the game leading up to the dictator’s decision reveals that it was likely (“reliable
random device”) or unlikely (“unreliable random device”) that the dictator would be able
to perform.
Using a within-subject design that allows us to observe dictators under both reliability settings, we show that the exogenous variation of the reliability of the random device
with which the game is played directly a¤ects the recipient’s …rst-order and the dictator’s
second-order expectations and that these signi…cantly change the dictator’s decision to keep
her promise. Our …ndings provide clean evidence for an expectation-based explanation of
promise-keeping: while the commitment created by promises between the two parties remains constant, second-order expectations increase due to the increase of the reliability of
the random device, which in turn induces an increase in the promisor’s performance rate.
Finally, with a simple structural model we recover subject-speci…c susceptibilities to guilt
aversion and characterize their distribution in the subject population. While slightly less
than half of our subjects are una¤ected by this behavioral trait, the remaining proportion
exhibits some degree of guilt aversion and there is signi…cant variation in how guilt-averse
these subjects are.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the design of the
experiment and the experimental procedures. In Section 3 we report our results. In Section
4 we present a simple model of promises and conditional guilt aversion and use it to estimate
guilt aversion in the subject population. Section 5 concludes. In the appendix we provide
additional regression results, instructions for the subjects participating in our experiment,
and formal proofs for our theoretical predictions.
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2

Experimental Design and Procedure

Our experiment is designed to investigate the role of expectations in promise-keeping. We
hypothesize that a dictator is more likely to keep her promise if she believes that the recipient
expects her to keep her promise. Underlying our hypothesis is the idea that a dictator will be
concerned about disappointing the recipient’s expectations created by the dictator’s promise.
Previous experiments were not designed to investigate this question, and hence they
either confounded expectation- and commitment-based explanations or they used the expectations created by other promisors as a means of varying the level of promisees’expectations.
Unlike in Vanberg (2008), in which the promisee’s second-order expectations depended on
additional promises made by a third party, in our experiment the promissory link between the
promisor and the promisee is unbroken. Rather, the magnitude of the dictator’s second-order
expectations is exogenously varied by the type of random device that is selected.

2.1

Experimental Design

In our experiment, subjects are randomly matched in pairs in each period and play the
experimental trust game depicted in Figure 1. The dictator sends the recipient a free-form
message. The recipient can then decide to opt in or opt out. Finally, the dictator decides
how much to contribute to the recipient.7
The main feature of our design is that, after the recipient decides to opt in, nature selects
whether the subjects play the game with a reliable or an unreliable random device. This
device determines how likely it is that the dictator will be able to choose some positive level
of performance (i.e., any action other than Don’t Perform). If the device is reliable, the
dictator will have a 5=6 chance to be able to choose among …ve possible actions (Perform,
3/4 Perform, 1/2 Perform, 1/4 Perform, Don’t Perform), four of which will deliver a positive
payo¤ to the recipient. If the random device is unreliable, the dictator will have only a 1=6
chance to be able to choose anything other than Don’t Perform. For example, if performance
is impossible, the dictator receives $14 and the recipient receives $0. If performance is
possible and the dictator chooses Perform, she receives $10 and the recipient receives $12.
7
This free-form message approach, which allows the dictator to send any message to the recipient (with the
exception of identifying information such as name, age, race, gender) follows previous research by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008). In contrast, Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) use pre-coded
messages and …nd only small e¤ects of such “bare” promises.
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Figure 1 depicts the remaining payo¤s for the two players. If the dictator chooses Don’t
Perform, the parties receive the same payo¤s (14; 0) as if performance had not been possible.
Dictator
Free-form Message (m)

2,2

Recipient d ∈ {0,1}

Opt Out (d=0)

Opt In (d=1)
Nature

Reliable (ρ=5/6) or
Unreliable (ρ=1/6) Device
Nature

ρ ∈ {1/6,5/6}

1-ρ: Cannot Perform (A0)

θ ∈ {0,1}

14,0

ρ: Can Perform (A1)

14,0

Dictator

Don’
t Perform

¼ Perform

¾ Perform

½ Perform

13,3

a ∈ A1
Perform

11,9

12,6

10,12

Figure 1: Dictator game with opt-out choice and reliable/unreliable device

Formally, the random device determines how likely it is that the dictator will …nd herself
in one of two states of the world,

2 f0; 1g, with associated action space A . This action

space depends on whether the dictator is only able to choose Don’t Perform,
able to choose other actions in addition,
a2A =

= 0, or is

= 1:

A0 = f0g
if
A1 = f0; :25; :5; :75; 1g if

=0
:
=1

Figure 1 illustrates that the dictator’s monetary payo¤ can be written as a function of her
decision a as
R (a)

D

(a) = 14

4a. Similarly, the recipient’s monetary payo¤ can be written as

= 12a.

The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of each period (t = 0), subjects
are randomly paired, and nature randomly determines the identity of the dictator and the
recipient in each pair. At t = 1 the dictator can send a free-form message m. In our
7

experimental analysis, these messages are coded as no message, empty talk, or promise,
(m) 2 f;; 0; 1g. At t = 2, the recipient decides to opt out or to stay in, d 2 f0; 1g. If
d = 0, the game ends and payo¤s (2; 2) for the dictator and the recipient are realized. If
d = 1, the game continues to t = 3. At t = 3, nature determines the type of the random
device

with which the game is played. The random device can be either reliable ( = 5=6)

or unreliable ( = 1=6), where

denotes the probability that the dictator will be able to

choose from action space A1 . Both parties learn the type

of the random device. At t = 4,

the dictator–but not the recipient–learns the state of the world
a 2 A . Thus if

and she makes the decision

= 1 the dictator knows that she can perform and, when making her choice,

she faces a recipient who plausibly expects a higher payo¤ under the reliable scenario than
under the unreliable scenario. At t = 5, both players learn their payo¤s, and the recipient
learns the state .
At t = 3, we also elicit the recipient’s and the dictator’s beliefs. The recipient is asked
which action a 2 A1 the dictator will choose if she is able to perform at t = 4. Because
now the recipient knows with which random device

the game will be played, these beliefs

might depend on the history of the game (realizations of

and ). We therefore denote

the …rst-order belief of the recipient by

R

( ; ) 2 [0; 1]. In turn, the dictator has a belief

(probability measure) regarding

D

( ; ) 2 [0; 1] denote the dictator’s mean second-

R.

Let

order belief about the recipient’s belief

R(

; ).8 As we discuss in our detailed description

of the experimental procedure, this elicitation of beliefs was incentivized. It is important to
note that at t = 4 (i.e., at the time when the dictator makes her decision) the dictator— but
not the recipient— knows the state of

(i.e., whether the dictator can perform at all).

This game is largely identical to the trust/dictator game in Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), with a few di¤erences. First, there is a richer action space to allow for more variation
in the contribution rates of dictators. Second, we use a within-subject design that asks
dictators to choose actions for both the reliable and unreliable device before either the
dictator or the recipient learns with which of the two devices the game will be played.9 Third,
8

Similar to the design in Vanberg (2008) the elicitation of the beliefs in our experiment restricts the set
of …rst- and second-order beliefs to a set of …ve elements. In our case, these beliefs also mirror the action set
A1 .
9
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) used the strategy method for the recipient’s initial opt-in decision.
There is an extensive literature exploring whether or not there are systematic di¤erences between withinand between-subject designs (Brandts and Charness 2000, Casari and Cason 2009, Charness, Gneezy, and
Kuhn 2012). One advantage of the within-subject design is that it ensures observation of the behavior of
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our design does not grant the dictator deniability of her actions vis-à-vis the recipient because
the recipient learns the state

at the end of the game.10 Finally, and most importantly, we

introduce a random device which determines the probability

with which the dictator will

be able to choose some positive level of performance, and we elicit beliefs
D

R(

; ) and

( ; ) after the recipient’s opt-in but before the dictator’s performance decision. The

main purpose of this design innovation is to exogenously vary (and measure) the dictator’s
and the recipient’s expectations without breaking any promissory link that exists between a
dictator and a receiver.
If the random device is reliable, then there is a probability of

= 5=6 that the dictator will

be able to choose Perform. If, on the other hand, the random device is unreliable, there is only
a probability of

= 1=6 that the dictator will be able to choose Perform. Thus, recipients

who are playing the game with an unreliable random device can plausibly expect lower
monetary payo¤s from the game. Because dictators are aware of this change in expectations
(due to independent variation in the experiment), their second-order expectations are also
exogenously changed. It is important to note that our manipulations cannot a¤ect the
commitment per se because at the time the promise is made, the dictator only knows that
the game is potentially played with the reliable or the unreliable random device, but she
does not know which of the two scenarios will subsequently be realized. Similarly, at the
time the dictator makes her decision at t = 4, she— but not the recipient— knows whether
she is able to perform independently of the random device used in the game. At this point,
only the history of the game di¤ers. If higher second-order expectations lead to higher
contribution rates by the dictators who promised to perform, this would constitute evidence
for the expectation-based explanation of promise-keeping.
Our design allows us to test the expectation-based explanation of promise-keeping. First,
because dictators experience more guilt under the reliable ( = 5=6) than the unreliable
each subject for exactly the same free-form message. We deem this crucial in a design which tries to vary
expectations while holding commitment constant. There are, however, shortcomings of such a within-subject
design because it introduces the possibility that participants may feel like they should di¤erentiate their
answers. Mischkowski, Stone, and Stremitzer (2016) report similar results to ours using a between-subject
design.
10
If the dictator chooses not to perform although she is able to, the recipient will know that the dictator
did not perform. Eliminating this deniability is important because it rules out “guilt from shame”(Battigalli
and Dufwenberg 2007, Tadelis 2011) as a competing explanation: a dictator would otherwise bene…t from a
higher level of deniability in the unreliable ( = 1=6) as opposed to the reliable ( = 5=6) device. Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) grant the dictator deniability, but because they do not use di¤erent random devices
they do not simultaneously vary simple guilt and guilt from shame.

9

( = 1=6) random device, we expect the dictator’s action a to be higher under the reliable
device. This is the central hypothesis we test in this paper.
Hypothesis 1 The dictator’s action choice, a, is higher for the reliable device than for the
unreliable device. (H1)
Testing this hypothesis relies on the exogenous variation induced by the two random
devices. It should induce di¤erential behavior if guilt aversion plays a role in the dictator’s
action choices. However, as discussed above, previous research found ambiguous evidence of
guilt aversion when there is no promissory link between the two parties. Thus, it is possible
that this exogenous variation will only have bite if the dictator has made a promise ( = 1).
If there is no promise (

= 0) or no message (

= ;) the dictator will likely feel less or

no guilt at all, with the result that there will be no di¤erence between the two devices.
Note though that our experiment is not speci…cally designed to test this second di¤erence
in behavior across message categories because we do not have a second source of exogenous
variation allocating di¤erent messages to subject pairs.
Second, because the type of random device creates di¤erent performance choices (see
H1), we also expect …rst- and second-order beliefs about the action chosen by the dictator
to di¤er. In particular, because performance is expected to be higher for the reliable random
device, …rst-order beliefs of recipients should adjust accordingly in the two settings. This
leads us to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 First-order beliefs,

R(

; ), and second-order beliefs,

D

( ; ), about the

dictator’s action choice, a, are higher for the reliable device than for the unreliable device.
(H2)
In contrast to the central hypothesis about contribution actions (H1) our second hypothesis regarding beliefs (H2) is more restrictive because it requires beliefs to adjust to the
changes in actions postulated in H1. The reason for this is as follows. Our design exogenously
varies the recipient’s …rst-order expectations 12
tations 12

D(

R(

) by letting subjects choose under

) and the dictator’s second-order expec= 5=6 and

= 1=6 to test the causal

impact of expectations on performance rates a (H1). For this change in performance to
occur, subject beliefs

R(

) and

D(

) need not change at all between

= 5=6 and

= 1=6

because the exogenous shock is already achieved through the multiplicative impact of
10

on

expectations. However, for the secondary prediction about the change in beliefs (H2) it is
necessary that performance rates actually di¤er between the two devices. In other words, in
order for beliefs to di¤er between the reliable and unreliable device we need actions to di¤er
(H2), but for actions to di¤er between reliable and unreliable device (H1) we do not need
beliefs to di¤er because expectations are already being shocked exogenously. We now test
these hypotheses in our data.

2.2

Experimental Procedure

We conducted 20 experimental sessions with a total of 280 student subjects at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL). The CASSEL subject pool consists
exclusively of UCLA undergraduate students. Subjects were assigned to visually isolated
computer terminals. Beside each terminal they found paper instructions, which are reproduced in Appendix B. Questions were answered individually at the subjects’seats.
Each session consisted of 2 unpaid practice rounds followed by 8 paying rounds. In
each round, subjects interacted with another randomly chosen participant. Under no circumstances did any participant interact with any other participant two times in the paying
rounds. We achieved this by creating matching groups of exactly 10 subjects. At the end
of the experiment, one of the 8 paying rounds was randomly chosen for payment. Each
round was equally likely to be selected. The amount paid out at the end of the experiment depended on the decisions made in that round. In each period we also elicited …rstand second-order beliefs of subjects about the behavior of other subjects. This elicitation
of beliefs was incentivized and to prevent hedging subjects were paid for all rounds except
the one chosen for payment of the decision. The subjects received a …xed fee of $10 for
arriving on time. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007).
First, each subject was randomly matched with an interaction partner, and one participant in each pair was randomly assigned to the role of dictator or the role of recipient.11
The pairings and the players’roles were randomly assigned anew in each round. A subject
was always equally likely to be assigned to either role, regardless of the previous messages
or actions in the game.
11

In the instructions, we neutrally refer to the role of the dictator and the role of the recipient as “Role
A” and “Role B,” respectively.
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Second, each dictator could send free-form messages to her recipient. The dictator could
send any number of (unidirectional) messages within a time frame of 90 seconds.12 Each
message could contain up to 256 characters. Subjects were not allowed to reveal their names
or any other identifying features such as race, gender, hair color, or seat number. In every
other respect, subjects were free to send any message they liked.
Third, after receiving the dictator’s message, each recipient could decide whether to opt
in or out. If the recipient chose to opt out, each player received $2. If the recipient chose to
opt in, the game continued. At this point, neither player knew whether the random device
determining whether the dictator would be able to perform was Random Device 5/6 (“reliable
random device”, probability of 5/6 that the dictator would be able to choose some action
other than Don’t Perform) or Random Device 1/6 (“unreliable random device”, probability
of 1/6 that the dictator would be able to choose some action other than Don’t Perform).
However, both parties knew that each scenario could occur with an equal probability of 50%.
Fourth, the recipient guessed which choice the dictator would likely make if she could
choose to perform, and the dictator guessed which payo¤ the recipient expected to receive.
Speci…cally, recipients and dictators were asked to choose from a …ve point scale. While
the recipient’s guessing payo¤ depended on the contribution decision of the dictator, the
dictator’s guessing payo¤ depended on the belief chosen by the recipient. Both payo¤s were
higher the closer they were to the actual contribution and belief, respectively.13 Consistent
with our use of the strategy method, we asked the players to make their guesses for both
reliability scenarios. We asked them to assume that both parties knew the game was played
with the reliable or the unreliable random device, respectively, and record their choices for
each scenario. Note that if a recipient thought that the dictator intended to choose Perform
(allocating $12), a recipient’s expected payo¤ depended on the reliability scenario. The
expected payo¤ was $2 if the game was played with Random Device 1/6 (12
and $10 if the game was played with Random Device 5/6 (12

1=6 = 2)

5=6 = 10). Asking the

dictator to make her guess in terms of the recipient’s expected payo¤ allowed us to make
those expectations particularly salient. These elicitations yielded …ve point scales between
0 (performance very unlikely) and 1 (performance very likely) for …rst- and second-order
12

Note that the 90-second time frame was not enforced. It just served as an informal pacemaker, but all
dictators concluded their communication before this time frame.
13
Except for o¤ering …ve (rather than two) potential choices for the contribution decision, our belief
elicitation method is identical to that used in Vanberg (2008).

12

beliefs.
Fifth, the dictator was asked to assume that she was able to perform, and to make her
contribution decision as if the game leading up to that point had been played with Random
Device 5/6 or Random Device 1/6. Figure 1 depicts the players’payo¤s under the di¤erent
possible contribution decisions.
Sixth, the computer randomly determined whether the game was played with the reliable
or unreliable random device and drew an equally likely integer between 1 and 6 for each pair
using z-Tree’s random number generator. If the random device was reliable it was possible
for the dictator to perform for the numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. If the random device was
unreliable, the dictator was able to perform for the number 1.
Finally, at the end of each round, both dictators and recipients learned with which random
device the game had been played, whether it had been possible for the dictators to perform,
and what payo¤s both participants had earned.

3

Results

The data comprise 20 experimental sessions involving a total of 280 subjects with a total
of 28 matching groups of 10 subjects. Each session lasted for 8 rounds. The average number of dictator decisions made by each subject is 4. As we used the strategy method to
elicit …rst- and second-order beliefs and contribution choices for both the reliable and the
unreliable device, this within-subject design gives us a total of 1,120 decisions made under
each reliability scenario. However, each matching group constitutes only one independent
observation. Non-parametric tests are therefore based on matching group averages of the
relevant variables. For comparisons between the random devices, we match observations that
allow us to use two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For unmatched comparisons between
message categories we use two-tailed Mann-Whitney rank-sum (MW) tests.14
14

For all the instances where the MW rank-sum test is used, we also used the Fligner-Policello (FP) test.
This test is a robust rank test for unmatched data which does not require that the two populations that are
to be compared have equal variances. See Section 4.4 of Hollander, Wolfe, and Chicken (2013) for a complete
description of the FP test. In our analysis the p-values of each MW rank-sum test and its corresponding FP
test are almost identical and we therefore omit reporting the results for the latter test.
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3.1

Performance Rates

We …rst examine how the experimental variation in beliefs a¤ected subject performance
rates. The average contribution (performance rate) the dictator gave to the recipient was
$5.76 (0.48) for the reliable device (

= 5=6) and $5.28 (0.44) for the unreliable device

( = 1=6), conditional on performance being feasible. While this di¤erence in contributions
is small in magnitude it is statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value < 0.01)
and consistent with our central hypothesis H1. The dictator chose higher performance
rates under the reliable device, when she was likely to be able to perform, than under
the unreliable device, when the ability to perform was unlikely. Furthermore, as we show
below, the magnitude of the contribution di¤erentials is in line with the small, but signi…cant
di¤erentials in second-order beliefs between the two random device settings, lending further
empirical support to the expectations-based explanation for promise-keeping. However, this
di¤erence in behavior between the two random devices is driven by dictators’decisions when
they had made a prior promise.
To investigate the role of promises, we asked a student assistant to code dictators’messages according to whether they contained a promise stating that the subject would choose
any action other than Don’t Perform. Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), this classi…cation yielded three categories: “no message” ( = ;) containing no text at all; “empty
talk” (

= 0) messages (e.g., “Hey I just met you/and this is crazy/but here’s my mes-

sage/so money maybe?”); and “promise”( = 1) messages (e.g., “im going to choose 3/4th
perform so please dont opt out”). After accounting for all opt-out decisions (see Section 3.4),
there remain 383, 300, and 268 individual observations, and 28, 27, and 28 matching group
observations in the three message categories (promise, empty talk, no message) for both
the reliable device and the unreliable device. We use these observations for our remaining
analysis.15
When the dictator made a promise ( = 1), the average contribution (performance rate)
she made to the recipient was $7.08 (0.59) for the reliable ( = 5=6) and $6.48 (0.54) for
the unreliable device ( = 1=6), conditional on performance being feasible. This di¤erence is
highly statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value < 0.01) and again consistent
with our central hypothesis H1. Dictators contributed signi…cantly more under the reliable
15

Our freeform message experimental design also allows the dictator to make conditional promises. However, no messages containing conditional promises were sent.
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device because in that scenario the random device exogenously induced higher second-order
expectations and hence more guilt when falling short of those heightened expectations.16
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Figure 2: Fraction of performance decisions of dictators (Don’t Perform, 1/4 Perform, 1/2
Perform, 3/4 Perform, Perform) who sent a message containing a promise and made di¤erent
decisions for the unreliable and the reliable device

Since we are employing the strategy method (and thus a within-subject design), it is
particularly instructive to examine the behavior of those dictators who made di¤erent contribution decisions in the unreliable and the reliable device settings. Figure 2 shows the
contribution decisions of dictators who promised to contribute and chose di¤erent contribution decisions depending on whether the device was reliable or unreliable.17 A much lower
proportion of dictators chose Don’t Perform for the reliable than for the unreliable device;
hence, more of them ended up choosing higher performance rates. While 40% of dictators
chose Don’t Perform under the unreliable device, less than 5% chose the same action under
the reliable device. As a result, a much larger proportion of dictators chose to contribute a
positive amount under the reliable device, with the 3/4 Perform action seeing the largest
increase.18
16

In Section 3.3 we show that in addition to generating higher second-order payo¤ expectations by design,
the reliable random device also induced higher second-order beliefs regarding actions.
17
Note that all of our statistical tests are based on the full sample of dictators and not just those dictators
who made di¤erent decisions for the reliable/unreliable device.
18
Figure 2 also shows that many subjects make interior choices of a, suggesting that guilt aversion is not

15

It is crucial to note that the statistically signi…cant di¤erence in dictator contributions
between the two settings disappeared when the dictator engaged in empty talk (

= 0,

Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value 0.27) or sent no message at all ( = ;, p-value 0.14). Thus,
in the absence of an explicit promise, higher reliability did not lead to signi…cantly higher
performance. These …ndings do not support H1, which hypothesized that contributions
should di¤er between the two reliability settings even if the dictator did not promise. Our
results suggest that the receiver’s expectations only in‡uence the dictator’s contribution
decisions when the dictator committed herself to a promise; they play little or no role when
the dictator made no promise.
These …ndings also suggest a particular structure for the role of expectations in promisekeeping: no matter how di¤erent the dictator’s second-order expectations under the two
reliability scenarios, the dictator will respond to them only if she initally made a promise.
However, our design is not ideally suited to directly test that expectations do not matter
for those dictators who did not make a promise, as the absence of an e¤ect could be due
to selection: dictators who are more likely to promise are also more likely to be a¤ected by
di¤erences in recipients’expectations. Still, some support for our conjecture may be derived
from the fact that Vanberg (2008) found no e¤ect of recipients’expectations on dictators’
decisions to perform when there was no promissory link, while we identify a positive e¤ect
on performance when such a direct promissory link exists.

.25
.5
.75
Performance Decision

1

0

.25
.5
.75
Performance Decision

1

.4
.35
0

.05

.1

.15

Fraction
.2
.25

.3

.35
0

.05

.1

.15

Fraction
.2
.25

.3

.35
0

.05

.1

.15

Fraction
.2
.25

.3

.35
.3
Fraction
.2
.25
.15
.1
.05
0

0

Reliable Device

.4

Unreliable Device

.4

Reliable Device

.4

Unreliable Device

0

.25
.5
.75
Performance Decision

1

0

.25
.5
.75
Performance Decision

1

Figure 3a: Same as Figure 2 for empty talk Figure 3b: Same as Figure 2 for no message
linear (k = 1), but that it is instead convex (k > 1) in the di¤erence between beliefs and actions. We explore
the magnitude of guilt aversion in greater detail in Section 4.2.
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Figure 3 depicts the same data as Figure 2 for those dictators who changed their contribution decision between the two settings, but its two panels instead focus on the message
categories of empty talk and no message, respectively. While there is a small change in
behavior (tending towards more generous contribution rates) from the unreliable to the reliable device for dictators who sent an empty talk message (Figure 3a), there is practically no
change for dictators who sent no message (Figure 3b). This slightly positive (but statistically insigni…cant) shift in dictator contribution rates is larger for empty talk messages than
for no messages. In a related experiment investigating commitment-based explanations of
promise-keeping, Ismayilov and Potters (2012) …nd that both trustees who make a promise
and those who do not are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the
trustor. Their …ndings as well as ours suggest that any form of communication increases
trustworthiness irrespective of the content of the message. This tentatively suggests that
the guilt aversion e¤ect is larger when there is some communication rather than none at
all. However, as noted above, in both cases (and in contrast to when the dictator made a
promise) there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the mean of the contribution decisions.
The highly signi…cant statistical di¤erence in performance rates between the reliable
and unreliable device for promises (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value < 0.01) and the lack of
statistical signi…cance for empty talk (p-value 0.27) and no message (p-value 0.14) are not
caused by large di¤erences in the number of individual observations (and hence statistical
power) across the three categories. This is because there are 383 (promise), 300 (empty
talk), and 268 (no message) individual observations, and 28, 27, and 28 matching group
observations, respectively, in the three message categories for both the reliable and the
unreliable device. Furthermore, in the …rst column of Table 1 we report point estimates
and standard errors adjusted for matching group clusters from a regression analysis that
controls for subject …xed e¤ects. The dependent variable is the performance rate a and
the independent variables are the message categories interacted with the reliability of the
random device such that “Promise” is the omitted category. As in our non-parametric
tests, the performance rate is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent between the two random
devices for promises as shown by the positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient 0.049 on “Promise
Reliable”. This di¤erence in performance between the reliable and unreliable device is lower
(though still positive) and not statistically signi…cant for the other two message categories
as shown by the coe¢ cients 0.025 on “Empty Talk
17

Reliable” and 0.022 “No Message

Reliable”. Furthermore, the di¤erence in performance between the two random devices
when the dictator has made a promise is signi…cantly larger than the di¤erence when the
dictator has sent no message (0.049 vs 0.022, p-value 0.04) as well as larger (though not
signi…cantly larger) than the di¤erence under empty talk (0.049 vs 0.025, p-value 0.12).
Thus, as before, the regression analysis suggests that the guilt aversion e¤ect is largest when
there is a promise, and that it is much less pronounced when the dictator uses empty talk
or sends no message. However, while the reliability mechanism is randomly assigned, the
message category is not. Hence, these are conditional treatment e¤ects.
Finally, in accordance with previous papers, average performance rates are higher if the
dictator made a promise (0.56) than if there was just empty talk (0.38) or no message (0.38)
(MW rank-sum, p-values < 0.01). This translates into a contribution di¤erence of $2.16,
about 3 times as large as the $0.60 di¤erence in contributions between the two random devices. The di¤erence in contributions between the reliable/unreliable devices is purely due to
di¤erences in second-order expectations. In contrast, the $2.16 di¤erence between dictators
who made a promise and dictators who sent empty talk or no promise, is a combination
of several e¤ects. It contains a selection e¤ect (subjects who promise are di¤erent from
those who do not promise), the commitment e¤ect (subjects feel compelled to contribute
just because of the promise per se) and the expectation e¤ect. Furthermore, in contrast to
face-to-face interactions between people who know each other well and may care strongly
about not disappointing the other party’s expectations, we would not expect the expectation e¤ect to be very large in magnitude in our anonymous, low-interaction experimental
laboratory setting. However, we show that even in this setting, which is very similar to
consumer-to-consumer e-commerce transactions, expectations matter.

3.2

First-Order Beliefs and Expectations

Having documented evidence for the expectation-based explanation by analyzing the differences in contribution rates across treatments, we now investigate whether the secondary
hypothesis regarding beliefs (H2) is also borne out in our data. Recipients were asked to
guess the dictator’s decision on a …ve-point scale between 0 and 1. When the random device
was reliable, the recipients had a mean …rst-order belief

R(

; 5=6) of 0.28; when the device

was unreliable, recipients had a lower mean …rst-order belief

R(

; 1=6) of 0.24. Although

the sign of this di¤erence is in accordance with H2 it is not statistically signi…cant (p-value
18

0.15).
The same pattern holds for comparisons within the three message categories. Under the
reliable device the average …rst-order beliefs were 0.23, 0.26, and 0.34 for no message, empty
talk and promise, respectively. Under the unreliable device they were lower across the board
at 0.22, 0.21, and 0.29. However, these di¤erences in …rst-order beliefs between the two device
settings are not statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values 0.17, 0.95, 0.45).
Even when the dictator sent a promise, the di¤erence in the recipient’s …rst-order beliefs is
not statistically signi…cant between a reliable and an unreliable device. We obtain similar
results from a subject …xed e¤ects regression (column 2 of Table 1). There is a positive
di¤erence in …rst-order beliefs between the reliable and unreliable random devices that is
largest and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level when there is a promise (coe¢ cient of
0.052). This di¤erence is smaller and statistically insigni…cant under empty talk (0.015), and
even smaller and insigni…cant under no message (0.010). Furthermore, the belief di¤erence
under a promise is signi…cantly larger than under no message (0.052 vs 0.010, p-value 0.08),
but not than under empty talk (0.052 vs 0.015, p-value 0.21). Thus, our experimental results
on …rst-order beliefs provide some evidence for H2, with the strongest evidence coming from
elicited beliefs when there is a promise and less so otherwise.
It is important to remember that we elicited conditional beliefs to allow for easy comparability across the two reliability devices. Recipients were asked how much they thought the
dictator would contribute if performance were feasible, as the recipients did not actually learn
whether performance was feasible for the dictator until after the end of each round. Therefore, the relevant …rst-order expectations at the time the dictator forms her second-order
expectations and makes her performance decision are given by the unconditional …rst-order
expectations, which are 12

R(

) . Thus, in order to obtain the …rst-order expectations in

terms of expected payo¤s, the elicited conditional …rst-order beliefs have to be multiplied by
5=6

12 = 10 for the reliable and by 1=6

12 = 2 for the unreliable device. We …nd that

these unconditional …rst-order beliefs are substantially higher in the reliable ($2.60, $2.30,
and $3.40) than in the unreliable scenario ($0.42, $0.44, and $0.58). These di¤erences are
all statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values < 0.01).19
19

This stark di¤erence is a (mechanical) feature of our experimental design. In contrast to previous
contributions, we do not vary second-order expectations through the endogenous variation of …rst-order
beliefs. Instead, we directly and exogenously change second-order expectations through the di¤erent random
device scenarios and the timing of when the dictator and the recipient learn about which random device was

19

Finally, for both outcome realizations of the random device, receiving a promise significantly raised the recipients’ expectations relative to receiving no message or empty talk
about how much they would receive from the dictator, moving …rst-order expectations from
the lower values of 0.23 and 0.26 to 0.34 and from 0.22 and 0.21 to 0.29, respectively (MW
rank-sum, p-values 0.007, 0.005, 0.022, 0.006). This pattern mirrors the results of Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008).

3.3

Second-Order Beliefs and Expectations

We next investigate how second-order beliefs
the belief

R(

D(

; ) (i.e., a dictator’s belief

D(

; ) about

; ) that the recipient has about the dictator’s performance decision) vary

with the reliability of the random device. When the random device was reliable, the average
second-order belief was equal to 0.64. In contrast, when the random device was unreliable,
the same second-order belief fell to 0.53. This di¤erence in second-order beliefs between the
reliable and the unreliable random device is statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank,
p-value < 0.01) and is in accordance with H2. That is to say, the dictator’s belief about the
contribution decision the recipient expected the dictator to make was signi…cantly higher
when the random device was reliable than when it was unreliable. As explained in detail
in Section 2 we hypothesize that this di¤erence in second-order beliefs is an equilibrium
response to the random device’s exogenous shocks to …rst- and second-order expectations.
These results on second-order beliefs hold for all message categories. Second-order beliefs
were 0.59 when the dictator sent no message, 0.59 for an empty talk message, and 0.72
when a promise was given under the reliable random device; they fell to 0.48, 0.43, and
0.64, respectively, under the unreliable counterpart. All of these di¤erences are statistically
signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values < 0.01). This was the case even when the dictator
did not send any message or sent an empty talk message. Once again, we obtain similar
results using a subject …xed e¤ects regression analysis reported in column 3 of Table 1. The
di¤erence in second-order beliefs between the two random devices is positive and signi…cant
when there is a promise. Yet, this is also true under empty talk and no message. However, as
shown in Section 3.1, contribution rates were not signi…cantly higher when expectations were
not supported by a promise. This again suggests a conditional structure of guilt aversion.
Although the second order beliefs vary for all message categories, they only seem to matter
chosen.
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for contribution decisions if there was a promise.
The second-order expectations given by E [

Rj D ;

] = 12

D(

) that correspond to these

second-order beliefs in‡uence the level of guilt experienced by the dictators. These secondorder expectations are equal to $5.88, $5.91, and $7.18 for the reliable device and signi…cantly
lower (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values < 0.01) for the unreliable device where they are equal
to $0.96, $0.87, and $1.28. This large di¤erence in second-order expectations is, of course,
mainly exogenously (and mechanically) created by the use of the random device and it serves
to separately identify the e¤ect of guilt aversion on promise-keeping.
Finally, the second-order beliefs in both reliability settings are signi…cantly higher for
promises than for empty talk and no messages (MW rank-sum, p-values < 0.01), illustrating
again the power of promises.

3.4

Promises and Opt-Out Decisions

Recipients chose to opt out at di¤erent rates depending on which message they received from
the dictator with whom they were paired. While only 7.3% of recipients chose to opt out
after receiving a promise, 21.6% opted out if they received no message at all, and 12.8%
opted out after an empty talk message. These di¤erential opt-out rates are consistent with
similar …ndings on the role of communication and promises (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006,
Vanberg 2008).
The di¤erences in opt-out rates between recipients who received a promise and those who
received an empty talk message, as well as between empty talk messages and no messages,
are only signi…cant at the 10% level (MW rank-sum, p-values 0.07, 0.07). In contrast,
the di¤erence in opt-out rates between participants who received a promise and those who
did not receive any message is signi…cant (MW rank-sum, p-value < 0.01). Similarly, the
di¤erence between participants who received a promise and (pooled) participants who did
not receive a promise, either because they received an empty talk message or no message at
all, is signi…cant at the 1% level (MW rank-sum, p-value < 0.01). In the regression analysis
of column 4 of Table 1, opt-out rates are signi…cantly higher under empty talk and even
higher under no message. The low opt-out rate of recipients who received a promise from
their partnered dictator indicates that the recipients expected higher relative payo¤s from
staying in the game than from opting out compared to recipients who received no message
at all or just an empty talk message. Furthermore, the higher opt-out rate for recipients who
21

received no message relative to recipients of an empty talk message suggests that some form
of verbal engagement is better than none at all when it comes to inducing recipients to stay
in the game.20

4

Discussion

Using exogenous variation in expectations our experimental results provide evidence for the
important role of guilt aversion in promise-keeping. However, our results, particularly those
for H1 in Section 3.1, also suggest that the role of guilt aversion is limited to settings in
which there exists a promise between the two parties. To formally explain this dichotomy in
our experimental …ndings as well as in the previous literature, we present a simple model that
builds on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti 1989, Battigalli
and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009) and captures the documented e¤ect of guilt aversion on promisekeeping. We then use this model to recover the distribution of guilt aversion in our subject
population.

4.1
4.1.1

A Simple Model of Promises and Conditional Guilt Aversion
Setup

Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) propose two general theories of guilt aversion based on
simple guilt and guilt from blame, respectively. The following model uses the former concept
of simple guilt in which the dictator cares about the (monetary) extent to which she lets
the recipient down.21 In contrast to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), where the degree to
which a dictator experiences guilt is based on the recipient’s expectation before his opt-in
decision, we use the recipient’s and dictator’s expectations after the recipient chose to opt in
because our experimental design shocks expectations after this stage. That is to say, what
matters for the dictator when he makes his contribution decision is the current expectation
of the recipient, not the recipient’s expectation at the time of the recipient’s choice to opt
in or out.22
20

This is in line with the aforementioned results of Potters and Ismayilov (2012) who also …nd that even
some limited form of communication (i.e., empty talk) increases trustworthiness.
21
Guilt could also be caused by expectations about the promisor keeping her promise, as opposed to
expectations of the recipient’s monetary outcome. The former concept of guilt need not be a¤ected by (the
experimental manipulation of) .
22
More generally, a philosopher might object to this terminology as it comes close to depicting guilt aversion
as a primary moral motivation. It can only be a secondary one, activated by a person’s belief that some

22

De…ne

D

0 as a constant measuring the dictator’s sensitivity to guilt from disappoint-

ing the recipient’s expectations, which the dictator expects to be equal to E [
12

D

Rj D ;

] =

( ). In line with our experimental results that show di¤erential responses under the

two random devices when there is a promise and when there is none, we posit that the role of
expectations in promise-keeping has a conditional structure: a recipient’s expectations only
play a role if the dictator has made a promise ( = 1). A recipient’s expectations will not
play a role if the dictator has not made a promise ( = 0) to the recipient.
The dictator’s utility UD when she chooses a at t = 4 can now be written in the following
way:
UD (a) =

D

= 14

(a)
4a

D

k
12k

(max fE [
D

k

Rj D
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D

( ; ); ]

( ; )

R
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a; 0g)k :

The last term of the dictator’s utility function captures the impact of guilt. This term
only plays a role if the dictator sent a promise (
to guilt aversion (
E[

Rj D ;

D

= 1) and if the dictator is susceptible

> 0). Guilt from disappointing the recipient’s perceived expectations

] by choosing a low payo¤

R

(a) for the recipient has a negative e¤ect on utility,

but there is no gain from exceeding the recipient’s expectations. The dictator can reduce the
negative utility from guilt by increasing her action a up to the point where it matches the
dictator’s beliefs about the recipient’s expectations. In contrast to Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009), we allow guilt to be linear (k = 1) or
convex (k > 1) in the di¤erence between the dictator’s expectations, E [
realized payo¤s for the recipient,

R

Rj D ;

], and the

(a). For k = 1, our model nests the model of Charness

and Dufwenberg (2006) as a special case that only admits corner solutions of a. For k > 1,
interior solutions of a (i.e., a 6= f0; 1g) are also possible.23
4.1.2

Analysis

There are two benchmark cases in which expectations do not a¤ect actions. First, a dictator
who is motivated solely by her own monetary payo¤ and is not sensitive to guilt at all,
D

= 0, would have a utility of 14

4a and would therefore maximize her payo¤ by choosing

other fact itself provides direct motivation to act. In this case, the prospect of disappointing expectations
would be wrong and therefore one should not do it.
23
For ease of presentation we focus on the latter case in the main text. In the appendix, we show that our
results also hold for k = 1.

23

a = 0.24 Second, in the settings considered by Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen et al (2010),
in which no direct promissory link between the dictator and the recipient exists and thus
= 0, beliefs about expectations

D

( ) also do not matter.

Thus, our model requires two assumptions for second-order beliefs to play a role in
promise-keeping. There must exist a promise between the two parties,
dictator must experience some guilt aversion,

D

= 1, and the

> 0. Second-order expectations will then

generate di¤erent predictions about the contribution choice a for the reliable ( = 5=6) and
the unreliable ( = 1=6) device. The dictator’s utility is given by
UD = 14

4a

12k

D

k

(max f

D

( )

a; 0g)k

(2)

which yields di¤erent levels of guilt for the two di¤erent devices and where we write
1; ) =
for

D

D(

=

( ) for simplicity. It is straightforward to see that the impact of guilt is larger

= 5=6 than for

= 1=6, thus leading to a higher equilibrium action a for two reasons.

First, there is a di¤erence in actions resulting purely from the exogenous variation in the
reliability

of the device. Second, there is an additional (second-order) e¤ect resulting from

the impact of this exogenous variation on equilibrium beliefs

D.

The …rst-order condition

with respect to a for the dictator yields the following interior solution:
a =

D

4
k
D 12

( )

1
k 1

(3)

The dictator’s action a is increasing with the reliability of the random device, , the dictator’s second-order belief,

D,

To see the …rst e¤ect of
same in both settings,

and her susceptibility to guilt aversion,

D.

on a, assume that second-order beliefs about actions are the

D (5=6)

=

D (1=6),

and that, just for ease of exposition, k = 1. As

can be seen from equation (2), the guilt experienced by the dictator when choosing a = 0
is 2
for

D D

for

= 1=6, which is much smaller in magnitude relative to the guilt experienced

= 5=6 where it is 10

D D.

This argument holds a fortiori for

D (5=6)

>

D (1=6)

as is

evident from the …rst-order condition for interior solutions of a from equation (3). Thus, in
equilibrium, the dictator chooses higher levels of a for
24

= 5=6 than for

= 1=6.25

Of course, there are many reasons other than guilt aversion, such as social preferences or norms (Rabin
1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009), that would predict
an equilibrium action a other than 0.
25
See Appendix C for a more rigorous proof of the theoretical predictions taking the possibility of corner
solutions into account.
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Theoretical Result 1 If there is a promise ( = 1), the dictator’s contribution action a is
higher for the reliable device than for the unreliable device. If there is no promise ( = 0),
there is no di¤erence in the dictator’s contribution action. (TR1)
TR1 is a modi…ed version of H1. In Section 3.1 we showed that contributions di¤ered
between the two reliability settings if the dictator promised, but not in the absence of a
promise. This lexicographic theory of promise-keeping can explain both the di¤erence in
contribution actions between random devices when there is a promise as well as the lack of
this di¤erence without an established promissory link between the two parties. Furthermore,
it also explains why Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) …nd evidence for guilt aversion while
Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen et al (2010) do not.
As a result of these di¤erent action choices, equilibrium …rst- and second-order beliefs
also di¤er in our model. In particular, because actions are higher for

= 5=6, equilibrium

…rst-order beliefs of recipients must adjust to the di¤erent actions that the dictator chooses
in the two settings. Hence, …rst-order beliefs are higher,
equilibrium second-order beliefs must be higher too,

D

R

(5=6)

(5=6)

R
D

(1=6) and, as a result,

(1=6) if

0.

Theoretical Result 2 If there is a promise ( = 1), …rst-order and second-order beliefs are
higher for the reliable device than for the unreliable device. If there is no promise ( = 0),
there is no di¤erence in …rst-order and second-order beliefs. (TR2)
Analogously, TR2 is a modi…ed version of H2. However, while we found strong support
for TR1 in our experimental data, the evidence for TR2 is mixed. As shown in Section
3.2 …rst-order beliefs only signi…cantly di¤er when there is a promise, but not otherwise.
At the same time, as shown in Section 3.3, second-order beliefs di¤er signi…cantly between
random devices for all message categories. Given this mixed evidence on …rst- and secondorder beliefs, in our ensuing estimation of the distribution of guilt aversion we only use
TR1 which results from the dictator’s optimal contribution decision a , and simply treat
the elicited beliefs

4.2

R

and

Distribution of

D

as given without requiring equilibrium consistency of beliefs.
D

Using this simple model, in particular TR1 about the dictator’s optimal contribution action,
we can directly recover each dictator’s susceptibility to guilt aversion,
25

D.

Because many

dictators choose strictly positive levels of performance a even when there is no promise
( = 0), we augment our previous model by an additional term that captures altruism. The
dictator’s utility function is then given by
UD =

D

D

(a)

k

(max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

D

(a) ; 0g)k

r

(12

where the dictator su¤ers a convex disutility if the receiver’s payo¤
maximum possible payo¤ of 12.26 If
D

D

R

(a))r

(a) falls short of his

R

= 0, the dictator is not driven by altruism, but as

increases she cares more about the payo¤ obtained by the receiver. The values of k and

r in‡uence the convexity of the guilt aversion and the altruism terms, and are assumed to
be known by the dictator and the recipient. Using identifying variation for subjects who
are observed in the data choosing a under both a promise ( = 1) and no promise ( = 0),
the unknown subject-speci…c altruism and guilt aversion parameters,

D

identi…ed from the two …rst-order conditions with respect to a under
@UD
=
@a
@UD
=
@a

12a)r

4 + 12

D

(12

4 + 12

D

(max f12

and

D,

= 0 and

are exactly
= 1:

1

D

12a; 0g)k

1

+ 12

D

(12

12a)r

1

Taking corner solutions at a = f0; 1g into account we use dictator-speci…c averages of a for
given

and

to solve for

D

and

D.

The two panels of Figure 4 show the distribution of the altruism and guilt aversion
parameters in the dictator population for quadratic altruism, r = 2, and quadratic guilt
aversion, k = 2.27 Given our assumptions, we are only able to identify the distribution of
D

for 104 dictators who are observed under both

= f0; ;g and

= 1. As suggested by

our reduced form analysis that documents a signi…cant positive shift in performance from
unreliable to reliable device when

= 1, the distribution of

than half of the dictators exhibit guilt aversion,

D

D

(Figure 4b) shows that more

> 0, while the remaining slightly smaller

proportion of just under 50% is una¤ected by this behavioral trait,
26

D

= 0.

By using altruism we chose a very simple form of other-regarding preferences. This is because more
general speci…cations could potentially lead to higher-order beliefs also playing a role. For example, dictators
could be making contributions according to what is expected of them independent of their initial statement.
27
Note that while convexity in the guilt aversion term (i.e., k > 1) is required to explain any subject
choices that are not corner solutions, we chose these particular parameters for their simplicity and their …t
with our data. Our results are largely unchanged under di¤erent parameter assumptions.
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Figure 4a: Altruism parameter
r=k=2

The dictators with a positive

D

D

for

15

Figure 4b: Guilt aversion parameter
r=k=2

20

D

for

fall into two broad categories as can be seen from Figure

4b. First, there is a mass of about 25% of all dictators (at

D

20) where

in equilibrium the dictators raise a su¢ ciently high such that a

D.

D

is so large that

In this way, they

reduce their own monetary payo¤ in order to completely avoid any loss from guilt aversion
which they would otherwise su¤er if they chose a lower performance a. Of course, the true
D

of these dictators might be even higher than 20, but these subjects are already at a corner

solution in our data. Second, for roughly 25% of dictators,

D

lies between the two mass

points of 0 and 20, and so these dictators trade o¤ some monetary gains against losses from
guilt aversion. They do not, however, raise a high enough to completely eliminate guilt in
equilibrium.

5

Conclusions

Many psychological and economic experiments have shown that promises greatly enhance
cooperative behavior in experimental games. In this paper we provided experimental evidence for the expectation-based explanation of promise-keeping. Previous experiments either could not distinguish between commitment-based and expectation-based explanations
because treatment-induced changes in the alternative causal factors (promises and secondorder beliefs) had occurred simultaneously, or the experiments focused on settings in which
there was no promissory link between the dictator and the recipient.

27

In contrast, we designed our experiment to achieve independent variation in secondorder expectations in an environment where these were supported by a direct promissory
link between the dictator and the recipient, and thus by the existence of a su¢ ciently high
level of commitment. Changes in the probability with which a dictator would be able to
contribute directly impacted recipients’…rst-order and dictators’second-order expectations,
which in turn signi…cantly changed behavior.
In light of our own …ndings that recipients’expectations matter if supported by a promise,
as well as previous …ndings which provide mixed evidence that expectations matter per se
(i.e., in the absence of a promise), we proposed a theory of conditional guilt aversion in which
we assume that the dictator’s sensitivity to the recipient’s expectations is switched on, or
at least heightened, by the fact that she has given a promise and therefore presumably feels
more responsible for the recipient’s expectations.
As we noted previously, our design was not suited to directly test our theory of conditional
guilt aversion. Speci…cally, our …nding that expectations do not matter in the absence of
a promise might also be due to di¤erent types of individuals choosing to make promises or
not. However, our ability to explain the experimental results through the lens of this theory
casts doubt on whether it is possible to conclude from Vanberg (2008) that promising per se
has an e¤ect on performance rates. To see this, imagine that the only motivation for keeping
a promise is that the promisor does not want to disappoint the promisee’s expectations.
Further assume that, consistent with our theory of conditional guilt aversion, the sensitivity
to the recipient’s expectations is only switched on by a promise. Then, under the expectationbased theory, we would predict that a dictator who has made a promise is more likely to
perform than a dictator who has not made a promise simply because her sensitivity to
expectations will only be switched on if she made a promise. Note that for this to happen
we need not assume any independent preference for promise-keeping. The whole e¤ect
could work exclusively through the desire not to disappoint expectations so long as they
are supported by a promise. In order to show that there is an independent preference for
promise-keeping we would have to design an experiment that varies the dictator’s promissory
commitment while keeping the recipient’s expectations at zero.
Our results also suggest an interesting avenue for future work in this area. Because
Vanberg (2008) and our design use exogenous variation in either promises or beliefs but not
both, one would wish to disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects in a design that provides exogenous
28

variation of both promises and beliefs. Recent contributions by Di Bartolomeo, Dufwenberg,
Papa, and Passarelli (2017) and by Mischkowski, Stone, and Stremitzer (2016) who, in
addition, provide evidence supporting our theory of conditional guilt aversion, are promising
endeavors to …ll this gap.
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A

Tables
(1)
Performance a

Promise

Reliable

Dependent Variable
(2)
(3)
1st-order belief R 2nd-order belief

D

(4)
Opt-out

0.049**
(0.018)
-0.077**
(0.034)
0.025
(0.033)
-0.092***
(0.022)
0.022
(0.020)

0.052*
(0.029)
-0.089***
(0.027)
0.015
(0.021)
-0.068**
(0.030)
0.010
(0.028)

0.076***
(0.021)
-0.122***
(0.036)
0.068**
(0.026)
-0.108***
(0.029)
0.056**
(0.022)

Subject FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Clusters

1902
28

1902
28

1902
28

1120
28

Empty Talk
Empty Talk

Reliable

No Message
No Message

Reliable

0.103**
(0.040)

0.139***
(0.043)

Table 1: Regressions for performance, 1st-order beliefs, 2nd-order beliefs, and opt-out rates
This table presents subject …xed e¤ects regressions with the performance rate (column 1), the 1st-order belief (column 2), the
2nd-order belief (column 3), and the opt-out rate as the dependent variable. In columns (1)-(3) the message categories and the
message categories interacted with the reliability of the random device are the independent variables where “Reliable” refers
to the reliable ( = 5=6) random device. In column (4) only the message categories are the independent variables because the
opt-out decision occurs before the random device shock. In all columns (1)-(4) “Promise” is the omitted category. Standard
errors clustered at the matching group are reported in parentheses. Corresponding p-values are denoted by stars: * p < 0:1, **
p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.

B

Instructions

Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study
how people make decisions in a particular situation. In case you should have questions at
any time, please raise your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the
experiment. You will receive $10 for arriving on time. Depending on the decisions made
and the decisions of other participants, you may receive an additional amount (as described
below). At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you individually
and privately in cash.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds and 8 paying rounds with money prizes. In each
round, you will interact with another randomly chosen participant. Under no circumstances
will you interact with the same participant twice. No participant will learn the identity of
the persons with whom he or she has interacted during the experiment.
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At the end of the experiment, one of the 8 paying rounds will be randomly chosen for
payment (every round is equally likely). The amount that you will receive at the end of the
experiment will depend on the decisions made in that round.
Each round consists of 7 steps, which are described below.
Overview
There are two players; Player A and Player B. Initially, A can send a chat message to
B over the computer, and B can decide whether he wants to opt out of the game, leading
to payo¤s of $2 for each player. If B does not opt out, a random device will determine
whether it will be possible for A to perform, that is, allocate money to B. If it is impossible
to perform, Player A gets a payo¤ of $14 and B gets a payo¤ of 0. If it is possible for A to
perform, he can make one of 5 choices:
Don’t Perform: A keeps $14 for himself and allocates $0 to B.
1/4 Perform: A keeps $13 for himself and allocates $3 to B.
1/2 Perform: A keeps $12 for himself and allocates $6 to B.
3/4 Perform: A keeps $11 for himself and allocates $9 to B.
Perform: A keeps $10 for himself and allocates $12 to B.
There are two types of Random Device
Random Device 5/6: A is able to choose something other than Don’t Perform with
probability 5/6.
Random Device 1/6: A is able to choose something other than Don’t Perform with
probability 1/6.
The players learn about the type of the random device after B has made his opt-out
decision.
Step 1: Role assignment. At the beginning of each round, you will be anonymously
and randomly matched with another participant. Each member of the pair will then be
randomly assigned Role A or Role B with equal probability (50%).
Step 2: Communication. During the communication phase, Player A can send a chat
message to Player B. Important: You are not allowed to reveal your identity to the other
participant. (That is, you may not reveal your name or any other identifying feature such
as race, gender, hair color, or seat number.) In every other respect, you are free to send
any message you like. Please continue to remain quiet while communicating with the other
participant. Participants who violate these rules (experimenter discretion) will be excluded
from the experiment and all payments.
Step 3: Opt-out decision. Player B can decide whether to opt out. If B chooses to opt
out, each player receives $2. If B chooses not to opt out, the game continues. Information:
Neither player knows, whether the Random Device determining if A will be able to choose
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Perform is Random Device 5/6 (probability that A can choose something other than Don’t
Perform is 5/6) or Random Device 1/6 (probability that A can choose something other than
Don’t Perform is 1/6). However, both parties know that each scenario occurs with equal
probability (50%).
Step 4: Nature of the Random Device revealed. The players learn whether they
play with Random Device 5/6 or Random Device 1/6.
Step 5: Guessing. Player B guesses which choice Player A is likely to make in Step 7.
A guesses which payo¤ B expects to gain. Note that if B thinks that A intends to choose
Perform— allocating $12— B’s expected payo¤ depends on what B has learned about the
Random Device: The expected payo¤ is $2 if the game is played with Random Device 1/6
(12 1=6 = 2) and $10 if the game is played with Random Device 5/6 (12 5=6 = 10).
Step 6: Player A learns whether he will be able to perform. If only Don’t Perform is
possible, the game ends. If A is able to perform, the game continues to Step 7.
Step 7: Decision phase. A decides whether to choose Don’t Perform (keep $14 and
send $0 to B), or whether to choose Perform (keep $10 and send $12 to B) or any of the
options in between. The payo¤s are

A chooses Don’t Perform
A chooses 1/4 Perform
A chooses 1/2 Perform
A chooses 3/4 Perform
A chooses Perform
B chooses “Opt Out”
Performance not possible

A
B
$14 $0
$13 $3
$12 $6
$11 $9
$10 $12
$2 $2
$14 0

Information at the end of a round. Players learn their own payo¤, which random
device was chosen, and the players learn whether player A was able to perform.
Conditional Choice. You will be asked to make the guess in Step 5 and the decision in
Step 7 before Step 4 has actually been played. In other words, you will be asked to assume
that A will be able to perform in Step 7, and then make the guess in Step 5 and the decision
in Step 7 for two scenarios:
1. Random device 1/6 was chosen.
2. Random device 5/6 was chosen.
Subsequently, Steps 4 and 6 are played and A’s recorded choice will be entered as A’s
decision in Step 7 (provided the game reaches this step). A’s decision will in‡uence payo¤s
as if A took the same decision in Step 7.
Bonus: Guessing. At certain points, you will have the additional possibility to earn
a small amount by guessing the decisions of the other participant. Guessing will be paid in
every round that is not chosen for payment of the decision. You will learn more about this
during the experiment.
Do you have any questions?
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C

Proofs

We use Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2007) general model of simple guilt to capture guilt
aversion in our model. Applying their formulation to our game and notation yields the
following utility function for the dictator
UD =

D (a)

D

max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

(a) ; 0g :

To this formulation we add the lexicographic structure of promise-keeping which is governed
by in our model, and we allow for convex guilt to obtain
UD =

D

(a)

D

k

(max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

(a) ; 0g)k

We will …rst prove TR1 by showing that the dictator’s equilibrium choice a after having
given a promise is strictly increasing in for su¢ ciently high guilt aversion and 0 otherwise.
The prediction for = 0 follows trivially from the dictator’s utility function in expression
(2). We distinguish two cases, k = 1 and k > 1.
Case k = 1: If k = 1, U (a) is a linear function in a and U 0 (a) = 4+12 D . It follows that
the equilibrium action a maximizing the dictator’s utility is given by the following corner
solutions:
0
if D 13
a =
(4)
1
D if D > 3 :
TR1 for k = 1 follows directly from (4).
Case k > 1: If k > 1, note that U 0 (a) = 4 < 0 on the interval [ D ; 1). Therefore, the
only candidate a
^1 for a maximizer of the dictator’s utility function on the interval [ D ; 1)
is the corner solution D , which is increasing in and D .
On the interval [0; D ), note that the dictator’s utility function is strictly concave as
00
U (a) = 12k (k 1) D ( D a)k 2 < 0 for all a 2 [0; D ). First, assume that U 0 (0) 0.
Then, it follows from the concavity of the dictator’s utility function that the a
^2 maximizing
the dictator’s utility function on the interval [0; D ) is a
^2 = 0, which is independent of .
Second, assume that U 0 (0) > 0, which holds for su¢ ciently high guilt aversion, i.e.,
D

4

>

Then, assuming a maximizer a
^3 exists on [0;
the following …rst-order condition:
a
^3 =
It can be seen that a
^3 increases in , in

k 1
D)

12k (

it must be an interior solution given by

4
k
D 12

D

D,

D ),

and
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:

D,

1
k 1

:
which proves TR1.

Beliefs and Second-order E¤ects on Performance So far we have implicitly assumed
that the dictator’s second-order beliefs are constant at D . However, as the dictator’s equilibrium choice a weakly increases in , …rst- and second-order beliefs must adjust accordingly.
Hence, R and D must be weakly increasing in . This yields TR2.
As the dictator’s equilibrium action is increasing in D , this adjustment of beliefs leads
to a (second-order) e¤ect, reinforcing TR1.
Opt-out Decision A (risk-neutral) recipient will opt in if
E[

R]

= 12E [

R

( )] > 2:

If = 0, the dictator will choose a = 0 and the recipient’s beliefs will adjust accordingly.
Hence, R ( ) and therefore also E [ R ] = E [ R ( )] will be higher for = 1 than for = 0.
As a result, opt-out rates will be lower for = 1 than for = 0.
Example: Assume that R ( ) = 0 for = 0, and R ( ) = 1 for = 1. Then we would
1=6
have 0 > 2 for = 0 and 12 1=2
= 6 > 2 for = 1:
1=2 5=6
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